

Slighted Success

The American Mobile Riverine Force and Its Impact in the Vietnamese Waterways
1966 - 1970

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Abstract

This is a historical study examining the impact of the American joint Army and Navy Mobile Riverine Force. This unique group was responsible for some major wins in the Mekong Delta, received thanks and acknowledgment from major military figures of the time, and accomplished a significant amount of its mission in a short time. However, this small group has not been widely discussed or credited. This study looks to assess the accomplishments of the MRF and investigate potential reasons for its historic underrepresentation.

Keywords: military, history, Vietnam, Riverine, Mobile, Force

The Vietnam War of the mid-twentieth century contained many unique circumstances. Though a considerable amount has been written about the United States' involvement in Vietnam, the Mobile Riverine Force, MRF, has not been heavily covered.¹ Though not always given historical attention through media, books, etc., the MRF was an important part of the United States' military operations. When it is mentioned, the MRF is usually heralded as being unique or "imaginative" and was stated to be "successful" by those in military command. Notably, Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland felt the MRF was important.² The MRF's missions are considered excellent in dealing with the "unusual nature of the enemy and the war," and it accomplished many goals set for its Force.³ Importantly, it moved toward those goals while in combat, using unfamiliar operations under the direction of multiple military branches. The MRF worked diligently toward its set goals in the Vietnam War and is deserving of recognition for its accomplishments.

Perhaps the best-known discourse about the MRF comes from John Kerry. He spoke up against the war after his experience on the Vietnam rivers. He felt he and his men were used as "bait" on the water to lure out the enemy and draw fire.⁴ This speaks to a less favorable opinion on the war, and, by extension, how some felt about the MRF.

The military produced positive publications. Examples include the 1970 "Amphibious Force" pamphlet that covered Naval power in the Pacific and the 1969 "Delta Division" brochure that focused on the

MRF and 9th ID.⁵ These publications pushed favorable ideas about the war and the military. Some brochures, like "Army North West," used the unique nature of the MRF to entice new enlistees even after the war.⁶

After Vietnam, a *New York Times* article said, "There is also a body of val[uable] opinion that urges greater study of riverine warfare and other close support tactics."⁷ The definitive text about the MRF that did just that is Major General William Fulton's official Vietnam Studies monograph solely about riverine operations.⁸ This was a thorough and official history, but with a personal bias due to Fulton's connection. Still, this work is cited in almost every MRF discussion.⁹

Following Fulton's work came a more detached form of MRF scholarship which looked at US riverine operations historically, comparing French river operations in Vietnam to those of the MRF, as well as the MRF to the United States Civil War river operations.¹⁰ The more detached writers became from the events, the less emotionally engaged was their writing, and thus

¹ See the Glossary in Appendix 1 as needed.

² William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 279.

³ Westmoreland, 279.

⁴ MPR News Staff, "In 1971 Speech, John Kerry Spoke of the Monster Created by the Vietnam War." Minnesota Public Radio News. September 26, 2017. Accessed February 14, 2019. <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/09/26/history-john-kerry-speaks-against-vietnam-war>.

⁵ Amphibious Force: United States Pacific Fleet, 1970. Pamphlet Archives: 1965-75, Viet Nam War, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington; Delta Division 1969, Pamphlet Archives: 1965-75, Viet Nam War, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.

⁶ Army North West, Pamphlet Archives: 1965-75, Viet Nam War, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.

⁷ Drew Middleton, "Lessons of War: Vietnam Spurs a Sweeping Review of Tactics and Weapons." *The New York Times*. January 29, 1973. Accessed February 13, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/29/archives/lessons-of-war-vietnam-spurs-a-sweeping-review-of-tactics-and.html>.

⁸ Fulton, RO.

⁹ William B. Fulton, *Mobile Riverine Force: America's Mobile Riverine Force in Vietnam*. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1997.

¹⁰ Baer, p. 391.; LTC Lester W. Grau and LTC Leroy W. Denniston, "When a River Runs Through It: Riverine Operations in Contemporary Conflict." *Infantry*, September 2014. Accessed February 3, 2019. <http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2014/Jul-Sep/pdfs/Grau.pdf>.

the more their work reflected research and documentation. This detachment also appears in modern works where facts and criticisms of larger military practices are discussed.¹¹ This criticism embodies a modern look at the MRF that makes room to celebrate its accomplishments while also objectively criticizing its shortcomings.

In texts that include it, the MRF is often distilled to a single paragraph. Though Westmoreland had high praise for the MRF, it takes up only a page in his book.¹² In Don Oberforfer's text on the 1968 Tet attacks, nothing is mentioned about the MRF, though Tet is an instance in which Westmoreland and others referenced the MRF as being important.¹³ Another text that fails to mention the MRF is George Herring's supposedly comprehensive history book, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950 – 1975*.¹⁴ The list of similar books goes on. This neglect could be due to the MRF's time of operation or its small numbers. In the span of an extensive war, the MRF was only operational in the late '60s and early '70s.¹⁵

The United States' official entrance into the Vietnam War is debated, but *military* involvement is easier to pinpoint. The Northern Vietnamese forces and the Viet Cong (VC), called such by the U.S. military, increased their efforts to take control of Vietnam, favoring a Communist government, compared to the American-backed government in the South. An increase in United States' commitments to Vietnam followed. Sobel relates that in May of 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the press that the United States intended to support Vietnam with "every possible help, across the entire

spectrum in which help is needed."¹⁶ The situation did quickly advance from financial aid to "the direct training and combat supervision of Republic of Vietnam/South Vietnamese (RVN) forces by US instructors."¹⁷ Then the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV) was formed, and ground troops were introduced in 1965.¹⁸ From this, many tactics and programs evolved, of which the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) was one.

In 1965 discussion began about how the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)/North Vietnamese forces and VC's flow of resources, information, and people through the rivers and deltas of southern Vietnam was hindering US military efforts. The discussion became how to stop that flow and clear the waterways. The VC were controlling the Mekong River and its main distributaries and had cut off the transportation of rice between cities.¹⁹

A posed solution was a specialized force called the "Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force" (MDMAF), which became the MRF. Intended to be a strike force to work on and along the rivers in bases, mobile bases, and ships.²⁰ Beginning at the end of 1966, this group was tasked with patrolling the rivers and deltas in South Vietnam, but was not fully integrated until the beginning of 1967.²¹ It remained in place until it began to be phased out in 1969, and was gone by 1970.²² Its plan centered on goals laid out in the official mission:

[to] secure U.S. base areas and lines of communication required for U.S. operations; conduct offensive operations against Viet Cong forces and base areas that posed a threat both to the national and to the IV Corps Tactical Zone priority areas

¹¹ Richard E. Sessoms, "The Brown Water Navy in the Mekong Delta: COIN in the Littorals and Inland Waters." PhD diss. Marine Corps University: Command and Staff College, 2008. Accessed February 22, 2019. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a490792.pdf>.

¹² Westmoreland, 279.

¹³ The Mobile Riverine Force Association. 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <http://www.mrfa.org/us-navy-army/riverine-assault-force-vietnam/>.

¹⁴ George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950 – 1975*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986.

¹⁵ Fulton, RO, 1.

¹⁶ Lester A. Sobel, ed. *South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in South-East Asia 1961-65*. New York: Facts on File, 1966. 19.

¹⁷ Sobel, 21.

¹⁸ Sobel, 25, and 37.

¹⁹ Fulton, RO, 25.

²⁰ Fulton RO, 25.

²¹ Fulton, William B. *Riverine Operations 1966-1969*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov. Print. Off., 1973. 56.

²² The Mobile Riverine Force Association. 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <http://www.mrfa.org/us-navy-army/riverine-assault-force-vietnam/>.

for rural construction in co-ordination with Republic of Vietnam armed forces and other U.S. forces; isolate the most heavily populated and key food-producing areas from Viet Cong base areas; interdict Viet Cong supply routes; and in co-ordination with the Vietnam armed forces provide reserve and reaction forces in the IV Corps Tactical Zone.²³

As of 1966, when discussing the formation of the MRF, there was believed to be a substantial enemy military and political presence in the Delta area comprised of combat troops, support troops, part-time guerillas, and a political cadre.²⁴ The VC used “small unit operations-harassment, terrorism, and sabotage,” with the Delta accounting for approximately one-third of all Viet Cong-initiated incidents in South Vietnam. They also had full battalions that posed a sizable threat to the Republic of Vietnam forces and the MRF.²⁵ Before the MRF, the VC dominated the Delta waterways,²⁶ using knowledge of the rivers, flat-bottomed sampans, and small boats to move people, information, and supplies throughout the Delta.²⁷ They also placed a myriad of water mines and land mines along the banks that the MRF had to contend with.²⁸

One way the MRF combated VC in the Delta was by keeping detailed records. The MRF used these reports to track where VC were and if extra patrols were needed. A report from mid-1968 detail all the missions that had occurred in the time between July and September. Maps were included to show routes deemed clear, both

waterways and adjacent roads.²⁹ This record-keeping was an organized overview documenting the flux of control.³⁰

Before MRF implementation, Navy Captain Wade Wells and Army Colonel William Fulton met in 1966 to discuss command structure. They decided each branch in the MRF would remain separate, with the Navy reporting to Navy leadership and the Army to Army leadership. Leadership on each side worked with, but did not report to, the other branch, and still operated cohesively.³¹ Still, discerning standards and terms were not without challenges³²—*Octofoil* writers and artists, through the use of both serious articles and humorous cartoons, were not afraid to point out micro-tensions between the Army and Navy MRF.³³ However, the men of the MRF adapted, and the way that these two branches of the military came together to conduct joint operations in unfamiliar situations is an important historical point.

Vietnam presented unique challenges by United States standards.³⁴ Westmoreland and other high-ranking leaders were World War II veterans.³⁵ This gave them a particular frame of reference about war, one that did not match Vietnam. To these men, the enemy in Vietnam was not easily identifiable, meaning there were not always uniforms or battle lines.³⁶ This made pacification difficult, leading to action on the rivers and resulting in the MRF, a combination of river patrol and search and destroy missions consisting of about 5,000 men.³⁷

²³ Fulton, RO, 32.

²⁴ Fulton, RO, 21.

²⁵ Fulton, RO, 23.

²⁶ “Remembering the Vietnam War 50 Years Later: The U.S. Mobile Riverine Force Succeeds in Operations Coronado.” Korean War Memorial | American Battle Monuments Commission. February 26, 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <https://www.abmc.gov/news-events/news/remembering-vietnam-war-50-years-later-u-s-mobile-riverine-force-succeeds>.

²⁷ “Remembering the Vietnam War 50 Years Later”

²⁸ Fulton, RO, 34-36.

²⁹ Headquarters US Army Group, IV CTZ MACV Advisory Team, “Review of Implementation of AB 143 3rd Quarter 1968,” 9th ID Papers 1960’s Viet Nam Era, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.; Appendix 2.

³⁰ Appendix 2: Images 1, 2, 3, and 4.

³¹ Chersicla.

³² Chersicla.

³³ *Octofoil: 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam*, Vol. 2 Apr May Jun, 1967, CMH 1959-1967, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.; Appendix 3.

³⁴ John Prados, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975*. Lawrence, KS: UP of Kansas, 2009. 177.

³⁵ Westmoreland, 18-24.

³⁶ Westmoreland, 279.; Prados, 177.

³⁷ *Octofoil: 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam* Vol. 1 Jan Feb Mar, 1967, CMH 1959-1967, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington. 8.

Before the creation of USMVAC, the waterways were not being held by the South Vietnamese Forces, who wanted to focus on offense.³⁸ In comparison, early MRF efforts were successful in that the organization was able to “[force] the enemy onto secondary rivers, disrupt Viet Cong troop movements, and open some areas to commercial traffic.”³⁹ This was an improvement on previous conditions.⁴⁰ Also, opening up commercial traffic for food transportation in South Vietnam was one of the core MRF goals. In the beginning, just main rivers were patrolled, but as the opposition forces moved to smaller rivers, eventually so did the U.S. patrols.⁴¹

Reports reflect that the MRF had a tangible impact on the war. The *Small Wars Journal* stated that “the presence of the MRF is credited with turning the tide of the war in the northern Mekong Delta in the favor of the United States and South Vietnam during 1967 and 1968.” This was because of its ability to limit or stop the VC use of waterways. Major Fulton said:

The Mobile Riverine Force, because of its mobility, strength of numbers, and Army-Navy co-operation, was capable of sustained operations along a water line of communications that permitted a concentration of force against widely separate enemy base areas.⁴²

Fulton was close to the MRF, but General Westmoreland also used the organization as an example. He stated that the MRF met Vietnam’s unique challenges in a way “that any military force has ever brought to bear.”⁴³ He is also said to have named the MRF as being what “saved the Delta”⁴⁴ in reference to the 1967 Tet Offensive and the MRF’s superior efforts. During the Tet Offensive, My Tho was hit hard by the VC. The MRF, at the time engaged in other missions, quickly moved on My Tho. MRF soldiers and sailors pushed the VC out, cleared the town, and secured it within three

days.⁴⁵ Some MRF troops were then sent to Cai Lay, helped gain control, and then moved a sizable distance on waterways to Vinh Long.⁴⁶ At Vinh Long, the MRF was able to block VC retreat routes. These were big accomplishments made by the MRF, who were able to help pacify multiple locations within a week while the Tet offensive raged elsewhere.⁴⁷

It was not until 1967 that the MRF established itself firmly in Vietnam, set up a base, and conducted combat operations.⁴⁸ It had been determined in 1965 that there was not a suitable place along the rivers to set up a base, so one was created by dredging.⁴⁹ The base near My Tho was yet another unique accomplishment.⁵⁰ The MRF concept extended, using larger crafts on the river as mobile bases.⁵¹ Men could sleep and live on these boats while being moved up and down the distributaries, dependent upon the changing battle lines. Mobile bases worked on a couple of levels, both military and relational. One goal of the MRF was to conduct its missions effectively while causing as little disruption to locals as possible.⁵²

Historians have given much attention to air power in Vietnam,⁵³ with countless scholarship exploring the iconic Huey helicopters and their part in the US search-and-destroy/search-and-clear missions. Another part of the search-and-destroy missions were conducted by the MRF from the rivers and deltas of Vietnam.⁵⁴ A general lack of solid battle lines ushered in this “primary ground

³⁸ Baer, 391.

³⁹ Baer, 390.

⁴⁰ Baer, 391.

⁴¹ Baer, 390.

⁴² Fulton, RO, 32.

⁴³ Westmoreland, 279.

⁴⁴ Chersicla.

⁴⁵ “Task Force – 117 – The Mobile Riverine Force Association.” The Mobile Riverine Force Association. 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <http://www.mrfa.org>

⁴⁶ “Task Force – 117 – The Mobile Riverine Force Association.”; Appendix 2, Map 5.

⁴⁷ “Task Force – 117 – The Mobile Riverine Force Association.”

⁴⁸ Fulton, RO, 58.

⁴⁹ Fulton, RO, 26.

⁵⁰ Fulton, RO, 33.; Appendix 2, Map 5.

⁵¹ Fulton, RO, 33.

⁵² Fulton, RO, 33.

⁵³ Sobel, 51 and 130-131.

⁵⁴ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1994. 391.

tactic” of search-and-destroy missions.⁵⁵ The tactic aimed for the troops to enter enemy territory, “[lay] waste to anything deemed valuable, [and] try to force a battle.”⁵⁶ As helicopters could land in open areas and spiral out, this tactic seemed appropriate. From boats, soldiers had to make their way up river banks and spread inland.⁵⁷ As Major Richard Meyer points out, there are pros and cons to each manner of attack—by air, land, or water—and according to him, the best approach is to combine at least two methods.⁵⁸

The MRF worked together in multiple capacities to claim victories in air, on land, and in water.⁵⁹ MRF Army troops used helicopters to conduct search-and-destroy missions before landing on pads attached to the river boats. Innovation led to improvised helidecks on more armored carriers until most could support a light helicopter.⁶⁰

Even with these collaborations, the MRF is overlooked in many historical circles. This is partially because the MRF’s operations were not considered prestigious. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt provides an explanation for this kind of overlook, hypothesizing that other high-ranking military personnel believed “[air] strikes meant glory of the Navy.”⁶¹ He specifically called out Admiral Thomas Moore as having made such comments. Moore considered air strikes to be “high end” attacks, whereas the river patrols were “low end.”⁶²

The MRF was successful, but it did not completely achieve its original mission. This critique is applicable to all US involvement in Vietnam, but for the MRF, it specifically concerns preventing VC use of the rivers and “interdict[ing] Viet Cong supply routes.”⁶³ The MRF’s original charter called for the complete prohibition of VC use of the rivers. Though reliable sources claim

“success,” this goal was not truly accomplished.⁶⁴ As a somewhat experimental group, the MRF was tactically but not strategically successful. This means that, though day-to-day missions were often successful, as were most of its larger goals, the MRF did not achieve its overall vision. The MRF was not well suited to take ground, even though that was not necessarily part of its plan. The inability to do so made it more difficult for the MRF to maintain control, and thus impossible to stop VC communication lines totally. Likewise, it was unable to prevent enemy use of the rivers or “clear” them entirely. This can be seen in the back-and-forth nature of the lines on the “Review of Implementation” maps. This is not to say that the MRF was a waste, nor is it negate the progress that it did make in the area. It is simply to acknowledge its shortcomings and reaffirm that even with these shortcomings, the MRF was still formidably impactful.

In reality, the MRF did meet most of its original goals. The *Small Wars Journal* relates that

Until 1967, enemy Main Force and Viet Cong units had moved virtually unhindered through the Dong Tam area. The enemy’s freedom of maneuver was greatly reduced, two Viet Cong battalions were pushed from the more populated areas, and the overall security in the city of My Tho was improved...Highway 4 was reopened in 1967 and produce from the agricultural heart of Vietnam was able to flow to market... the MRF contributed to the overall counterinsurgency effort of the United States by pursuing the Viet Cong into what had long been uncontested sanctuaries.⁶⁵

This, when compared to the list of goals laid out for the MRF in the beginning, shows a lot of completion. The MRF did have secure lines of communication, even if the VC were continually trying to thwart those communication paths. The MRF conducted many offensive operations which showed tangible results. It helped restore the supply of food by gaining control of the areas in which the food was grown, and it combined

⁵⁵ John H. Hay, *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Materiel Innovations*. Washington D.C.: Dept. of Defense, Dept. of the Army, 1974. 169.

⁵⁶ Prados, 137.

⁵⁷ Hay, 169-171.

⁵⁸ Meyer, Richard. “The Ground-Sea Team in River Warfare.” 9th ID Papers 1960’s Viet Nam Era, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.

⁵⁹ McCabe, 152-153.

⁶⁰ Chersicla.

⁶¹ Baer, 390.

⁶² Baer, 390.

⁶³ Fulton, RO, 32.

⁶⁴ Westmoreland.; “Task Force 115 – The Mobile Riverine Force Association.”

⁶⁵ Chersicla.

its efforts with the South Vietnamese forces in different situations. Having these strategic goals and achieving most of them earns the MRF some level of success.⁶⁶

Compared to the strategic goals, more open-ended goals were met too. Part of the MRF's official goal was to "...locate, encircle, and destroy communist units in battle."⁶⁷ In this pursuit, the MRF found more success, as its ambiguity allowed for a better fit to the reality of what the MRF was accomplishing.

Perhaps the MRF's most prestigious accomplishment is being credited with turning the tide of the war in its area.⁶⁸ In 1967 and 1968, it made major gains. However, it did not single-handedly change the trajectory of the conflict as Dr. John Darrell Sherwood points out:

While the mobility, firepower, logistical support, and amphibious capability provided by the MRF was the secret sauce that allowed Westmoreland to quickly reverse the Viet Cong gains and turn his attention to the battles occurring near the demilitarized zone in I Corps, other units also contributed mightily to the effort.⁶⁹

Still, given the broader understanding of its experimental, combined-military makeup, the MRF was still groundbreaking on its own. The tactics developed by the MRF were successful and brought brief attention to riverine warfare in general. The Army and Navy had struggled in trying to catch themselves up after 100 years of effectively no riverine warfare. After Vietnam, river operations faded again until they were suddenly needed in Iraq, around 30 years after the dismantling of the MRF. If MRF history teaches anything, it may be that we should not pause in the study of such tactics, even if they aren't in high demand. The continued

study, rhetoric, and inquiry into the Vietnam-era MRF and modern riverine tactics could help to prepare a US fighting force to face a similar challenge in the future. Through its detailed progress reports and the legacy of its success, the MRF left a lot of material to be gleaned for the future of riverine warfare according to the authors of "When a River Runs Through It", who compare Vietnam river operations to those in modern Iraq.⁷⁰

Though there are modern applications to studying the MRF, it is not talked about as much as other dimensions of the Vietnam war. No matter its lack of present-day prominence, the MRF still has a rich history. Though it did not single-handedly change the tide of the war or stop VC communication, the MRF did contribute to major operations while hindering VC efforts. Its contributions were important and deserve to be discussed.

⁷⁰ LTC Lester W. Grau, and LTC Leroy W. Denniston, "When a River Runs Through It: Riverine Operations in Contemporary Conflict." *Infantry*, September 2014. Accessed February 3, 2019. <http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2014/Jul-Sep/pdfs/Grau.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Fulton, RO, 32.

⁶⁷ "Riverine Assault Force (Vietnam) – The Mobile Riverine Force Association." The Mobile Riverine Force Association. 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <http://www.mrfa.org/us-navy-army/riverine-assault-force-vietnam/>.

⁶⁸ Chersicla.

⁶⁹ Dr. John D. Sherwood, "Defending the Mekong Delta: Tet and the Legacy of the Brown-Water Navy." War on the Rocks. January 31, 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/tet-navy/>.

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Appendix 1

Glossary

DRV – Democratic Republic of Vietnam/North Vietnam

ID – Infantry Division

MDMAF – Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force

MRF – Mobile Riverine Force

MVAC – Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

RVN – Republic of Vietnam/South Vietnam

USMVAC – United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

VC – Viet Cong

Appendix 2 - Maps



Map 1

Headquarters US Army Group, IV CTZ MACV Advisory Team, "Review of Implementation of AB 143 3rd Quarter 1968." 9th ID Papers 1960's Viet Nam Era, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.



Map 4

Headquarters US Army Group, IV CTZ MACV Advisory Team, "Review of Implementation of AB 143 3rd Quarter 1968." 9th ID Papers 1960's Viet Nam Era, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.




Map 2

Headquarters US Army Group, IV CTZ MACV Advisory Team, "Review of Implementation of AB 143 3rd Quarter 1968." 9th ID Papers 1960's Viet Nam Era, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.



Map 5


Delta Division 1969, Pamphlet Archives: 1965-75, Viet Nam War, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.



Map 3

Headquarters US Army Group, IV CTZ MACV Advisory Team, "Review of Implementation of AB 143 3rd Quarter 1968." 9th ID Papers 1960's Viet Nam Era, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.

Appendix 3



Octofoil: 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, Vol. 2 Apr May Jun, 1967, CMH 1959-1967, Fort Lewis Museum Archives Collection. Tacoma, Washington.